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/ Thursday, July 17, 2008
[Federal Register: July 17, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 138)]
[Notices]
[Page 41118-41126]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr17jy08-123]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States of America v. Signature Flight Support Corporation
and Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 5 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, Hold
Separate and Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, and
Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in United States of America
v. Signature Flight Support Corporation and Hawker Beechcraft Services,
Inc., Civil Action No. 1:08-cv-01164-RWR.
On July 3, 2008, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that
the proposed acquisition by Signature Flight Support Corporation
(``Signature'') of the fixed base operations (``FB'') of Hawker
Beechcraft Services, Inc. (``Hawker Beechcraft'') at the Indianapolis
International Airport (``IND'') would violate Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Complaint alleges that the acquisition would
combine the only providers of FBO services at IND, resulting in higher
prices and reduced services. The proposed Final Judgment requires the
parties to divest either Signature's or Hawker Beechcraft's FBO assets
at IND.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, Hold Separate and
Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order, and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at the Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, Room 1010, 450 5th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481), on the
Department of Justice's Web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr, and at
the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from
the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set
by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within sixty (60) days of the date of
this notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in
the Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be
directed to Donna N. Kooperstein, Chief, Transportation, Energy &
Agriculture Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Suite
4100, 450 5th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-
6410).
Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530,
Plaintiff, v. Signature Flight Support Corporation, Signature Plaza,
201 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1100, Orlando, Florida 32801, and Hawker
Beechcraft Services, Inc., 10511 East Central, Wichita, Kansas 67206,
Defendants
Civil Action No.:
Filed:
Case: 1:08-cv-01164.
Assigned To: Roberts, Richard W.
Assign. Date: 7/3/2008.
Description: Antitrust.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust
action to enjoin the proposed acquisition by Signature Flight Support
Corporation (``Signature'') of fixed base operations of Hawker
Beechcraft Services, Inc. (``Hawker Beechcraft'') and to obtain
[[Page 41119]]
equitable and other relief. The United States alleges as follows:
I. Nature of the Action
1. On February 21, 2008, Signature and Hawker Beechcraft signed a
definitive agreement for Signature to acquire Hawker Beechcraft's
United States' fixed base operations (``FBO'') for $128.5 million. FBOs
provide flight support services--including fueling, hangar rentals,
office space rentals, and other services--to general aviation
customers. Signature is the largest fixed base operator in the world
and operates FBOs at more than forty-five around the country. Hawker
Beechcraft operates FBOs at seven airports in the United States. Both
Signature and Hawker Beechcraft operate FBOs at the Indianapolis
International Airport (``IND'').
2. Signature and Hawker Beechcraft are the only two FBOs operating
at IND Airport. They compete directly on price and quality of FBO
services to general aviation customers. The acquisition would eliminate
this competition, creating an FBO monopoly at IND. The acquisition
would give Signature the ability to raise prices and lower the quality
services at IND for general aviation customers. Unless the transaction
is enjoined, the proposed acquisition is likely to lessen competition
substantially in the market for FBO services at IND in violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
3. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain
Defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
4. The defendants are engaged in interstate commerce and in
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. Signature and
Hawker Beechcraft provide FBO services to aircraft landing throughout
the United States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
action and jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 22 and
25, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
5. Venue is proper in this district as Signature and Hawker
Beechcraft have consented to venue and personal jurisdiction in this
judicial district.
III. Defendants and the Proposed Transaction
6. Signature is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBA Aviation PLC, a
supplier of aviation machinery, support, and repair. Signature is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Orlando,
Florida. Signature owns and operates more than sixty FBO facilities in
the United States, including its FBO operation at IND.
7. Hawker Beechcraft is a Kansas corporation with its principal
place of business in Wichita, Kansas. Hawker Beechcraft owns and
operates seven FBO facilities in the United States, including its FBO
operation at the IND Airport.
8. On February 21, 2008, Signature and Hawker Beechcraft executed a
Sale of Line Service Business Asset Purchase Agreement under which
Signature will acquire all of Hawker Beechcraft's FBO assets for
approximately $128.5 million.
IV. Trade and Commerce
The Relevant Market
9. FBO services include the sale of jet aviation fuel (``Jet A
fuel'') and aviation gasoline (``avgas''), as well as related support
services, to general aviation customers. FBOs usually do not charge
separately for services such as conference rooms, pilot lounges, flight
planning, and transportation. Instead, they recover the cost of these
ancillary services in the price that they charge for fuel. FBOs charge
separately for hangar and office rentals, aircraft storage, tie-down
and ground services, deicing, and catering.
10. The largest source of revenue for an FBO is fuel sales. FBOs
sell Jet A fuel for jet aircraft, turboprops and helicopters, and avgas
for smaller, piston-operated planes. At IND, Signature and Hawker
Beechcraft sold approximately $17 million of fuel in 2007, and obtained
additional revenues of approximately $3 million for other FBO-related
services.
11. General aviation customers cannot obtain fuel, hangar, ramp and
related services at IND except through the FBOs authorized to sell such
products and services by the local airport authority, leaving general
aviation customers landing at IND no alternatives to the Signature and
Hawker Beechcraft FBOs for these services. Obtaining FBO services at
another airport would not provide an economically practical alternative
for general aviation customers who currently use IND. A small but
significant post-acquisition increase in the prices for fuel, hangar
space, and other FBO services would not cause general aviation
customers to switch to other airports in sufficient quantities to make
such a price increase unprofitable.
12. Thus, the provision of FBO services to general aviation
customers is a relevant product market and IND is a relevant geographic
market (i.e., a line of commerce and a section of the country) under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
Anticompetitive Effects
13. The market for FBO services at IND is highly concentrated, with
only two providers--Signature and Hawker Beechcraft. If Signature
acquires the Hawker Beechcraft FBO facility, it will have a monopoly in
the market for FBO services at IND. Currently, based on fuel sales,
Signature has 46 percent of the IND FBO market, and Hawker Beechcraft
has 54 percent.
14. Competition between Signature's and Hawker Beechcraft's FBO
facilities currently limits the ability of each to raise prices for FBO
services. The proposed acquisition would eliminate the competitive
constraint each imposes upon the other. This would to lead to a
monopoly, resulting in higher prices for FBO services, as well as lower
quality of service, at IND in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
15. Successful entry into the provision of FBO services at IND
would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to deter the anticompetitive
effects resulting from this transaction. Timely entry sufficient to
replace the market impact of Hawker Beechcraft would be difficult for
several reasons. The entrant would need to get the approval of the
airport authority, obtain permits, and construct facilities, all of
which require extensive lead time to complete. Successful entry would
be unlikely to occur in response to a small but significant and non-
transitory post-merger price increase.
V. Violation Alleged
16. The United States hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 15.
17. Unless restrained, Signature's proposed acquisition of Hawker
Beechcraft's FBO facility at IND is likely to tend to create a monopoly
in the market for FBO services at IND in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, in the following ways:
a. Actual and potential competition between Signature and Hawker
Beechcraft in the market for FBO services at IND will be eliminated;
b. Competition in the provision of FBO services at IND will be
eliminated; and
c. Prices for FBO services to general aviation customers at IND
will likely increase and quality of service will likely decrease.
VI. Request for Relief
18. The United States requests that:
[[Page 41120]]
a. Signature's proposed acquisition of Hawker Beechcraft's FBO
facility at IND be adjudged and decreed to be unlawful and in violation
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
b. Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf be
preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained from consummating
the proposed transaction or from entering into or carrying out any
contract, agreement, plan, or understanding, the effect of which would
be to combine Signature's and Hawker Beechcraft's FBO operations at
IND;
c. The United States be awarded its costs for this action; and d.
the United States receive such other and further relief as the Court
deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James J. O'Connell, Jr.
James J. O'Connell, Jr.
Acting Assistant Attorney General, DC Bar #464109
/s/ Patricia A. Brink
Patricia A. Brink
Deputy Director, Office of Operations
/s/ Donna N. Kooperstein
Donna N. Kooperstein
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section
/s/ William H. Stallings
William H. Stallings
Assistant Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section
/s/ Angela L. Hughes
Angela L. Hughes
DC Bar #303420
Michelle Livingston
DC Bar #461268
Trial Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Transportation, Energy
& Antitrust Division, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section,
450 Fifth Street, NW, Room 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone:
(202) 307-6410, Facsimile: (202) 307-2784.
Dated: July 3, 2008.
United States District Court for the District Of Columbia
United States of America, Plaintiff v. Signature Flight Support
Corporation and Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc., Defendants
Civil Action No.: I :08-cv-O1164.
Description: Antitrust.
Judge: Roberts, Richard W.
Date Stamp: 7/3/08.
Proposed Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiff, the United States of America (``United
States''), filed its complaint on July ------, 2008, the United States
and defendants, Signature Flight Support Corporation (``Signature'')
and Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc. (``Hawker Beechcraft''), by their
attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without this
Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any
party regarding any issue of law or fact;
And whereas, defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is prompt and
certain divestiture of certain assets by the defendants to assure that
competition is not substantially lessened;
And whereas, the United States requires defendants to make certain
divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, defendants have represented to the United States that
the divestitures required below can and will be made, and that
defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture
provisions contained below;
Now, therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the
parties, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against the defendants under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Acquirer'' means the entity to whom defendants divest the
Divestiture Assets.
B. ``Signature'' means defendant Signature Flight Support
Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Orlando,
Florida, its successors and assigns, and its parents, subsidiaries,
divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and
their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
C. ``Hawker Beechcraft'' means defendant Hawker Beechcraft
Services, Inc., a Kansas corporation headquartered in Wichita, Kansas,
its successors and assigns, and its parents, subsidiaries, divisions,
groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
D. ``IND'' means Indianapolis International Airport, located in the
Indianapolis, Indiana metropolitan area.
E. ``IND FBO Services'' means any or all services related to
providing fixed base operator services to general aviation customers at
IND, including, but not limited to, selling fuel, leasing hangar, ramp,
and office space, providing flight support services, providing access
to terminal facilities, or arranging for ancillary services such as
rental cars or hotels.
F. ``FBO Facility'' means any and all tangible and intangible
assets that comprise the business of providing IND FBO Services,
including, but not limited to, all personal property, inventory, office
furniture, materials, supplies, terminal space, hangars, ramps, general
aviation fuel tank farms for jet aviation fuel and aviation gas, and
related fueling equipment, and other tangible property and all assets
used in connection with the business of providing IND FBO Services; all
licenses, permits, registrations, and authorizations issued by any
governmental organization relating to the business of providing IND FBO
Services subject to licensor's approval or consent; all contracts,
teaming arrangements, agreements, leases, commitments, certifications,
and understandings relating to the business of providing IND FBO
Services, including supply agreements; all customer lists, contracts,
accounts, and credit records; all other records relating to the
business of providing IND FBO Services, all intangible assets used in
the development, production, servicing, and sale of IND FBO Services,
including, but not limited to, all licenses and sublicenses, technical
information, computer software and related documentation, know-how,
drawings, blueprints, designs, design protocols, specifications for
materials, specifications for parts and devices, and safety procedures
for the handling of materials and substances.
G. ``Divestiture Assets'' means either of the following:
1. All rights, titles and interests, including all fee, leasehold
and real property rights, in Hawker Beechcraft's existing and future
FBO Facilities at IND that Signature acquires in the Proposed
Transaction; or
2. All rights, titles and interests, including all fee, leasehold
and real property rights, that Signature possesses in its FBO Facility
at IND.
H. ``Proposed Transaction'' means Signature's proposed acquisition
of certain assets from Hawker Beechcraft pursuant to the Sale of Line
Service Business By Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc. to Signature
Flight Support Corporation Asset Purchase Agreement Dated February 21,
2008 that
[[Page 41121]]
is the subject of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Filing
2008-0879.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to Signature and Hawker Beechcraft,
as defined above, and all other persons in active concert or
participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final
Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
B. If, prior to complying with Section IV or V of this Final
Judgment, Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially
all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an
agreement from the acquirer of the assets divested pursuant to this
Final Judgment.
IV. Divestitures
A. Defendants are ordered and directed, within ninety (90) calendar
days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter or after five (5)
calendar days after notice of entry of this Final Judgment by the
Court, whichever is later, to divest the Divestiture Assets in a manner
consistent with this Final Judgment to an Acquirer acceptable to the
United States, in its sole discretion. The United States, in its sole
discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of this time period,
not to exceed sixty (60) calendar days in total, and shall notify the
Court in such circumstances. If pending state or local regulatory
approval is the only remaining matter precluding a divestiture after
the 90-day period, the United States will not withhold its agreement to
an extension of the period. Defendants agree to use their best efforts
to complete the required divestiture as expeditiously as possible.
B. In accomplishing the divestiture ordered by this Final Judgment,
defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary means, the
availability of the Divestiture Assets. Defendants shall inform any
person making inquiry regarding a possible purchase of Divestiture
Assets that they are being divested pursuant to this Final Judgment and
provide that person with a copy of this Final Judgment. Defendants
shall offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, subject to
customary confidentiality assurances, all information and documents
regarding the Divestiture Assets customarily provided in a due
diligence process, except such information or documents subject to the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The documents
provided to prospective Acquirers shall include (1) The Land and
Special Facilities Lease Agreement By and Between Hawker Beechcraft
Services, Inc. and The Indianapolis Airport Authority dated February
2008; (2) the Sublease between Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc. and
Signature Flight Support Corporation and the Addendum thereto; and (3)
the agreement entitled Sale of Line Service Business By Hawker
Beechcraft Services, Inc. to Signature Flight Support Corporation Asset
Purchase Agreement Dated February 21, 2008 and all attachments and
exhibits relating to IND. Defendants shall make available such
information to the United States at the same time that such information
is made available to any other person.
C. Defendants shall provide the Acquirer and the United States
information relating to the personnel involved in the operation,
management, and sale of the Divestiture Assets to enable the Acquirer
to make offers of employment. Defendants will not interfere with any
negotiations by the Acquirer to employ any defendant employee whose
primary responsibility is the operation, management, and sale of the
Divestiture Assets.
D. Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture
Assets to have reasonable access to personnel and to make such
inspection of the physical facilities of the Divestiture Assets and to
examine the blueprints and other plans relating to any physical
facilities of the Divestiture Assets under construction or proposed for
construction; access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other
permit documents and information; and access to any and all financial,
operational, or other documents and information customarily provided as
part of a due diligence process.
E. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer of the Divestiture
Assets that each asset will be operational on the date of sale.
F. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way
the permitting, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
G. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer of the Divestiture
Assets that there are no material defects in the environmental, zoning,
or other permits pertaining to the operation of each asset, and that
following the sale of the Divestiture Assets, defendants will not
undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental,
zoning, or other permits relating to the operation of the Divestiture
Assets.
H. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the
divestiture pursuant to Section IV, or by a trustee appointed pursuant
to Section V, of this Final Judgment, shall be accomplished in such a
way as to satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that the
Divestiture Assets can and will be used by the Acquirer as part of a
viable, ongoing business engaged in providing IND FBO Services. The
divestiture, whether pursuant to Section IV or Section V of this Final
Judgment: (I) shall be made to an Acquirer that in the United States's
sole judgment has the intent and capability (including the necessary
managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability) of
competing effectively in the provision of IND FBO Services; and (2)
shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in its sole
discretion, that none of the terms of any agreement between an Acquirer
and defendants gives defendants the ability unreasonably to raise the
Acquirer's costs, to lower the Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to
interfere in the ability of the Acquirer to compete effectively.
V. Appointment of Trustee
A. If defendants have not divested the Divestiture Assets within
the time period specified in Section IV(A) of this Final Judgment,
defendants shall notify the United States of that fact in writing. Upon
application of the United States, the Court shall appoint a trustee
selected by the United States and approved by the Court to effect the
divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only that
trustee shall have the right to sell the Divestiture Assets. The
trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish the
divestiture to an Acquirer acceptable to the United States at such
price and on such terms as are then obtainable upon reasonable effort
by the trustee, subject to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of
this Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as this Court
deems appropriate. Subject to Section V(D) of this Final Judgment, the
trustee may hire at the cost and expense of defendants any investment
bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely accountable to
the trustee, reasonably necessary in the judgment of the trustee to
assist in the divestiture.
C. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any
ground other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such objections by
defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the
trustee within ten (10) calendar days after the trustee has provided
the notice required under Section VI.
D. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants,
on such
[[Page 41122]]
terms and conditions as the plaintiff approves, and shall account for
all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the trustee and
all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of the
trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and those of any
professionals and agents retained by the trustee, all remaining money
shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be terminated. The
compensation of the trustee and any professionals and agents retained
by the trustee shall be reasonable in light of the value of the
Divestiture Assets and based on a fee arrangement providing the trustee
with an incentive based on the price and terms of the divestiture and
the speed with which it is accomplished, but timeliness is paramount.
E. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture. The trustee and any
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the
trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books,
records, and facilities of the Divestiture Assets, including the
blueprints and other plans relating to any physical facilities of the
Divestiture Assets under construction or proposed for construction, and
defendants shall develop financial or other information relevant to the
Divestiture Assets as the trustee may reasonably request, subject to
reasonable protection for trade secrets or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information. Defendants shall take no action
to interfere with or to impede the trustee's accomplishment of the
divestiture.
F. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports
with the United States and the Court setting forth that trustee's
efforts to accomplish the divestiture ordered under this Final
Judgment. To the extent such reports contain information that the
trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the
public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name,
address and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding
month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and
shall describe in detail each contact with any such person. The trustee
shall maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the
Divestiture Assets.
G. If the trustee has not accomplished the divestiture ordered
under this Final Judgment within six (6) months after its appointment,
the trustee shall file promptly with the Court a report setting forth:
(1) The trustee's efforts to accomplish the required divestiture, (2)
the reasons, in the trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture
has not been accomplished, and (3) the trustee's recommendations. To
the extent such reports contain information that the trustee deems
confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket of
the Court. The trustee shall at the same time furnish such report to
the United States, who shall have the right to make additional
recommendations consistent with the purpose of the trust. The Court
shall enter such orders as it shall deem appropriate to carry out the
purpose of the Final Judgment, which may, if necessary, include
extending the trust and the term of the trustee's appointment for a
period requested by the United States.
VI. Notice of Proposed Divestiture
A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendants or the trustee, whichever is then
responsible for effecting the divestiture required herein, shall notify
the United States of any proposed divestiture required by Section IV or
V of this Final Judgment. If a trustee is responsible, the trustee
shall similarly notify defendants. The notice shall set forth the
details of the proposed divestiture and list the name, address, and
telephone number of each person not previously identified who offered.
expressed an interest in or a desire to acquire any ownership interest
in the Divestiture Assets together with full details of same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United
States of such notice, the United States may request from defendants,
the proposed Acquirer, any other third party, or the trustee if
applicable, additional information concerning the proposed divestiture,
the proposed Acquirer, and any other potential Acquirer. Defendants and
the trustee shall furnish any additional information requested within
fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt of the request, unless the
parties shall otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or
within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been
provided the additional information requested from defendants, the
proposed Acquirer, any third party, and the trustee, whichever is
later, the United States shall provide written notice to defendants and
the trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not it objects to the
proposed divestiture. If the United States provides written notice that
it does not object, the divestiture may be consummated, subject only to
defendant's limited right to object to the sales under Section V(C) of
this Final Judgment. Absent written notice that the United States does
not object to the proposed Acquirer or upon objection by the United
States, the divestiture proposed under Section IV or V shall not be
consummated. Upon objection by defendants under Section V(C), a
divestiture proposed under Section V shall not be consummated unless
approved by the Court.
VII. Financing
Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made
pursuant to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment.
VIII. Hold Separate
Until the divestiture required by this Final Judgment has been
accomplished, defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with
the Hold Separate Stipulation and Order entered by this Court.
Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestiture
ordered by this Court.
IX. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until the
divestiture has been completed under Section IV or V, defendants shall
deliver to the United States an affidavit as to the fact and manner of
compliance with Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each such
affidavit shall include the name, address, and telephone number of each
person who, during the preceding thirty (30) days, made an offer to
acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations
to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any
interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each
contact with any such person during that period. Each such affidavit
shall also include a description of the efforts defendants have taken
to solicit buyers for the Divestiture Assets and to provide required
information to prospective purchasers, including the limitations, if
any, on such information. Assuming the information set forth in the
affidavit is true and complete, any objection by the United States to
information provided by the defendants, including limitation on
information, shall be made within fourteen (14) days of receipt of such
affidavit.
B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint
in this matter, defendants shall deliver to the United States an
affidavit that describes
[[Page 41123]]
in reasonable detail all actions defendants have taken and all steps
defendants have implemented on an on going basis to comply with Section
VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall deliver to the United
States an affidavit describing any changes to the efforts and actions
outlined in defendants' earlier affidavits filed pursuant to this
section within fifteen (15) calendar days after the change is
implemented.
C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to
preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after the
divestiture has been completed.
X. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege,
from time to time authorized representatives of the United States
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (``DOJ''), including
consultants and other persons retained by the United States, shall upon
written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable
notice to defendants be permitted:
1. Access during defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or
at the option of the United States, to require defendants to provide
hard copy or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts,
records, data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of
defendants relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment;
and
2. To interview, either informally or on the record, defendants'
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel
present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or
interference by defendants.
B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
defendants shall submit written reports or response to written
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this Section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by
defendants to the United States, defendants represent and identify in
writing the material in any such information or documents for which a
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent
page of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United
States shall give defendants ten (10) calendar days prior to divulging
such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury
proceeding).
XI. No Reacquisition
Defendant Signature may not reacquire any part of the Divestiture
Assets during the term of this Final Judgment.
XII. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.
XIII. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall
expire ten (10) years from the date of its entry.
XIV. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and
any comments thereon and the United States's responses to comments.
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Dated:-----------------------------------------------------------------
Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Signature Flight Support
Corporation and HAWKER BEECHCRAFT SERVICES, INC., Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1:08-cv-O1164.
Description: Antitrust.
Judge: Roberts, Richard W.
Date Stamped: 7/3/08.
Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry
in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
Defendant Signature Flight Support Corporation (``Signature'') and
Defendant Hawker Beechcraft Services, Inc. (``Hawker Beechcraft'')
entered into an agreement, dated February 21, 2008, pursuant to which
Signature would acquire the fixed base operations (FBO) of Hawker
Beechcraft. The United States filed a civil antitrust complaint on July
--, 2008, seeking to enjoin the proposed acquisition. The Complaint
alleges that the effect of this acquisition would be to combine the
only providers of FBO services at Indianapolis International Airport
(``IND''), creating a monopoly and violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States also
filed a Hold Separate and Preservation of Assets Stipulation and Order
(``Stipulation and Order'') and a proposed Final Judgment, which are
designed to eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition.
Under the proposed Final Judgment, which is explained more fully below,
the defendants are required to sell either the Signature or Hawker
Beechcraft FBO assets at IND to a purchaser who has the capability to
compete effectively in the provision of FBO services to general
aviation customers at that airport.
Until the divestiture of either the Signature or Hawker Beechcraft
FBO assets at IND, the Stipulation and Order requires the defendants to
take all steps necessary to preserve both companies' FBO assets at IND
and ensure that Hawker Beechcraft's FBO business operates as an
independent, ongoing, economically viable, competitive business at IND
held entirely separate, distinct and apart from Signature's IND FBO
business. Further, until the
[[Page 41124]]
required divestiture is accomplished, the defendants must take all
steps necessary to ensure that Hawker Beechcraft's FBO business at IND
will be maintained and operated as an ongoing, economically viable and
active line of business; that competition between Signature and Hawker
Beechcraft in the provision of FBO services at IND is maintained during
the pendency of the ordered divestiture; and that the defendants
preserve and maintain their IND FBO assets. The Stipulation and Order
thus ensures that competition is protected pending completion of the
required divestitures and that the assets are preserved so that relief
will be effective.
The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the
proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA.
Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action,
except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or
enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish
violations thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation
A. The Defendants and the Proposed Transaction
Signature is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BBA Aviation PLC, a
supplier of aviation machinery, support, and repair. Signature is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Orlando,
Florida. Signature is the world's largest FBO operator and operates
more than forty-five FBO facilities in the United States. Signature's
2007 revenues from its United States FBO operations were approximately
$600 million.
Hawker Beechcraft is a Kansas corporation with its principal place
of business in Wichita, Kansas. Hawker Beechcraft is a manufacturer of
business, special-mission, and trainer aircraft, and designs, markets
and supports aviation products and services for businesses,
governments, and individuals. The company also operates FBO facilities
at seven airports in the United States including IND. Hawker
Beechcraft's 2007 revenues from its FBO operations were approximately
$73 million.
By an agreement dated February 21, 2008, Signature proposes to
acquire Hawker Beechcraft's FBO assets at seven airports in the United
States for $128.5 million. IND is the only airport at which both
companies compete in the provision of FBO services.
B. The Competitive Effects of the Transaction on the FBO Services
Market
1. The Relevant Market
The Complaint alleges that the proposed transaction would eliminate
competition in the provision of FBO services at IND in violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. FBOs are facilities located at airports
that provide fuel and related support services to general aviation
customers. General aviation customers include charter, private, and
corporate aircraft operators, as distinguished from scheduled
commercial airlines.
Fuel sales are the largest source of FBO revenues. FBOs usually do
not charge for services such as conference rooms, pilot lounges, flight
planning, and transportation. Instead, they recover the cost of these
services in the price that they charge for fuel. FBOs also derive
income from hangar and office rentals, aircraft storage, tie-down and
ground services, deicing, and catering services.
General aviation customers cannot obtain fuel, hangar, ramp, and
related services at IND except through an FBO authorized to sell such
services by the local airport authority, leaving general aviation
customers departing from or landing at IND no alternatives to Signature
and Hawker Beechcraft FBOs for these services. Obtaining FBO services
at other airports in the Indianapolis region would not provide an
economically practical alternative for these general aviation
customers. Many general aviation customers select IND over other
airports in the area for the available hangar space, as well as the
necessary safety features of a control tower and longer runway length
and the airport's proximity to downtown Indianapolis. General aviation
customers at IND would not switch to other airports in the Indianapolis
region in sufficient numbers to prevent anticompetitive price increases
for fuel and other FBO services at IND.
2. The Proposed Merger Would Produce Anticompetitive Effects
Signature and Hawker Beechcraft are the only two competitors in the
provision of FBO services at IND. Competition between them currently
limits the ability of each to raise prices for FBO services. The
proposed acquisition would eliminate the competitive constraint each
imposes upon the other. This would lead to a monopoly at IND, resulting
in higher prices for FBO services and lower quality of service in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Successful entry would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to
deter the anticompetitive effects resulting from this transaction.
Timely entry sufficient to replace the market impact of Hawker
Beechcraft would be difficult for several reasons. The entrant would
need to get the approval of the airport authority, obtain permits, and
construct facilities, all of which require extensive lead time to
complete. Successful entry would be unlikely to occur in response to a
small but significant and non-transitory post-merger price increase.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
The divestiture requirement of the proposed Final Judgment will
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the market
for FBO services provided to general aviation customers at IND by
establishing a new, independent, and economically viable competitor.
The proposed Final Judgment requires the Defendants to divest, as a
viable ongoing business, either the Signature or the Hawker Beechcraft
FBO assets at IND.
Hawker Beechcraft currently has a long-term lease with the IND
airport authority under which it has rights to use several buildings
and other assets, including fuel storage facilities, to provide both
FBO and non-FBO maintenance for planes manufactured by the company.
Signature also operates its FBO business at IND under a long-term lease
with the airport authority. Under the transaction agreement, Signature
will obtain rights equivalent to Hawker Beechcraft's rights with
respect to the FBO assets it uses to provide FBO services at IND. If
Signature chooses to divest the Hawker Beechcraft FBO assets at IND,
the acquiring company will acquire all interests and rights that
Signature will acquire under its agreement with Hawker Beechcraft. This
not only includes rights to use all buildings that Hawker Beechcraft
currently uses to provide FBO services at IND, but also includes, when
Hawker Beechcraft completes construction of a new facility at IND next
year, the exclusive rights to use all the new buildings Hawker
Beechcraft will build for the provision of FBO services at IND. Thus, a
purchaser of either the Hawker Beechcraft Divestiture Assets or the
Signature Divestiture Assets will have the same ability to compete in
the IND FBO market as Hawker Beechcraft or Signature had prior to the
acquisition.
In antitrust cases involving acquisitions in which the United
States seeks a divestiture remedy, the United States seeks to require
completion of the
[[Page 41125]]
divestiture within the shortest period of time reasonable under the
circumstances. A quick divestiture has the benefits of restoring
competition lost in the acquisition and reducing the possibility that
the value of the assets will be diminished. Section IV(A) of the
proposed Final Judgment requires the defendants to complete the
divestiture within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
Complaint in this matter, or five (5) calendar days after notice of the
entry of this Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The proposed Final Judgment also provides that this time
period may be extended one or more times by the United States in its
sole discretion for a period not to exceed sixty (60) calendar days,
and that the Court will receive notice of any such extension. The
proposed Final Judgment provides that if pending state or local
regulatory approval is the only remaining matter precluding a
divestiture after the 90-day period, the United States will not
withhold its agreement to an extension of the period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assets must be divested so as to satisfy the United States, in
its sole discretion, that the operations can compete effectively in the
relevant market. Defendants must take all reasonable steps necessary to
accomplish the divestiture quickly and shall cooperate with prospective
purchasers.
In the event that the Defendants do not accomplish the divestiture
within the period prescribed in the proposed Final Judgment, the Final
Judgment provides that the Court will appoint a trustee selected by the
United States to effect the divestiture of either the Signature or
Hawker Beechcraft Divestiture Assets. If a trustee is appointed, the
proposed Final Judgment provides that Defendants will pay all costs and
expenses of the trustee. The trustee's commission will be structured so
as to provide an incentive for the trustee based on the price obtained
and the speed with which the divestiture is accomplished. After his or
her appointment becomes effective, the trustee will file monthly
reports with the Court and the United States setting forth his or her
efforts to accomplish the divestiture. At the end of six (6) months, if
the divestiture has not been accomplished, the trustee and the United
States will make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such
orders as appropriate, in order to carry out the purpose of the trust,
including extending the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.
The divestiture provisions of the proposed Final Judgment will
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the
provision of FBO services at IND.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.
V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the
proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance
with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has
not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public
interest.
The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding
the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the
proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so
within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive
Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States Department of Justice, which
remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at
any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the
response of the United States will be filed with the Court and
published in the Federal Register.
Written comments should be submitted to: Donna N. Kooperstein,
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section, Antitrust
Division, 450 5th Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against the defendants. The
United States could have continued the litigation and sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions against Signature's acquisition
of Hawker Beechcraft's FBO assets. The United States is satisfied,
however, that the divestiture of assets described in the proposed Final
Judgment will preserve competition for the provision of FBO services at
IND. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment would achieve all or
substantially all of the relief the United States could have obtained
through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, and uncertainty of a
full trial on the merits of the Complaint.
VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination,
the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is
required to consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification,
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) The impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived
from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(l)(A)&(B). In considering these statutory factors,
the court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is
entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the
reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56
F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United States v. SBC
Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public
interest standard under the Tunney Act).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in
directing relevant factors for court to consider and amended the
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C.
16(e)(2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc'ns,
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 41126]]
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things,
the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific
allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree
is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the
relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.''
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001). Courts have held that:
[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.
Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\3\
In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest,
a district court ``must accord deference to the government's
predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require
that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461
(noting the need for courts to be ``deferential to the government's
predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies''); United States
v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003)
(noting that the court should grant due respect to the United States'
prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the
market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co.,
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the
`reaches of the public interest' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own,
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the
reaches of public interest.' '' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky.
1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have
imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States
``need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements
are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns,
489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459. Because the ``court's
authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government's
exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first
place,'' it follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the
decree itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to
inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Id.
at 1459-60. As this Court recently confirmed in SBC Communications,
courts ``cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest
determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a
mockery of judicial power.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve
the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The language wrote into the statute
what Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as
Senator Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to
trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect
of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through
the consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the
recognition that the court's ``scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone'');
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (``Absent a showing of corrupt
failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in
making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully, consider
the explanations of the government in the competitive impact
statement and its responses to comments in order to determine
whether those explanations are reasonable under the
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6
(1973) (``Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the
approach that should be utilized.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials or documents within the
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
Dated: July 3, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,
--------/s/--------
Angela L. Hughes (DC Bar 30342 10),
Michelle Livingston (DC Bar 461268),
Trial Attorneys
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Transportation,
Energy, and Agriculture, 450 5th Street, NW., Suite 4100 Washington,
DC 20530.
[FR Doc. E8-16254 Filed 7-16-08; 8:45 am]
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